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RICHARD A. POSNER*
The editors have invited me to reply to Professor Ian Shapiro, who in a recent
article' concludes from an examination of my views on wealth maximization,2 my
book on the federal courts, 3 and my judicial votes and opinions in labor and antitrust
cases that the economic ideas in these writings are "nothing more than thinly veiled
ideology to legitimate the inequalities wrought by market systems" (p. 1046). "The
amazing thing is that these arguments can have so much influence among lawyers
when they were thoroughly discredited by welfare economists over thirty years ago.
That, one supposes, is eloquent testimony to the staying power of an intellectually
bankrupt but dominant ideology" (p. 1046).
These quotations convey the flavor of Shapiro's piece; and it is with flavor that
I begin. Despite its academic jargon and hefty footnotes, the piece is not a work of
detached scholarship, but of angry polemic. One of the rhetorical tricks on which
Shapiro relies to persuade the reader, illustrated by the second sentence I quoted (the
last in his article), is to shift the plane of discussion from whether my ideas are sound
or unsound to how anyone could believe such rubbish. This is a ploy calculated to
induce a feeling of sheepishness in any reader inclined to think those ideas might have
some merit. A related device, which surfaces in the second sentence of Shapiro's
article, is to equate disagreement with proof: "I reveal the internal logic of Richard
Posner's microeconomic conception of judicial efficiency to be fallacious . . . . I
establish ... that he fails to adhere consistently to either his microeconomic or his
macroeconomic conceptions of efficiency as a judge" (p. 999; emphasis added).
The article insinuates that I am not merely someone who holds views sharply
different from those of Ian Shapiro but someone who is at once obtuse and sly,
someone who "does not see" (p. 1003), who "seems unable to distinguish
neoclassical models from reality" (p. 1045), who "sidesteps" embarrassing facts
with a "quip" (p. 1004), who plays "conceptual games" (p. 1003), who is "quite
wrong" (p. 1024) yet displays "quite staggering offhand confidence" (p. 1006), who
offers replies that are "entirely unsatisfactory" (p. 1021), whose ideas are "ad hoc,"
"asserted without argument," "naive," "pernicious," and "much ado about
nothing" (pp. 1041, 1046), who makes assertions that are "indefensible" (p. 1044),
"sheer fancy, and empirically implausible to boot" (p. 1007). I am also disingenu-
ous, for I can only be "forced to admit" my exaggerations ("Even Posner is here
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law
School. I thank Frank Easterbrook for his comments on a previous draft.
1. Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 999 (1987). Unless otherwise indicated, my page
references are to this article.
2. Primarily as presented in my book THE EcoNoMtIcs O JUSTICE (1981). Shapiro does not cite any of my more
recent writings on wealth maximization-an omission to which I shall return.
3. R. PosNER, THE FEDERAL. CouRTs: CISIS AND RE-ORM (1985).
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forced to admit," p. 1045), 4 and-my craftiest move-I disclaim originality in "an
attempt to undermine the force of" a criticism first made years after the disclaimer
was entered (indeed, first made in Shapiro's article) (p. 1022).
The hyperbole, the abuse, the censoriousness, the speculation about my
motives-what purpose can all this serve? Only readers strongly predisposed to
Shapiro's message will be swayed, and they do not need swaying. Neutral readers
will be distracted from the substance of Shapiro's article-to which I now turn.
Shapiro first presents, and criticizes, what he understands to be my views about
wealth maximization. Wealth maximization is the policy of trying to maximize the
totality of goods and services, tangible and intangible (leisure is included, for
example), weighted by willingness to pay. It is the state of affairs achieved in
well-functioning competitive markets. The goal of a wealth maximizing society
would be to promote and protect free markets, and to simulate the operation of those
markets in settings where natural monopoly, scarcity of information, or externalities
prevent markets from operating effectively. "Wealth" in the sense in which I use the
term is the concept of welfare employed by most economists in addressing problems
of market failure, is the basis of the Marshallian demand curve, and is the heart of the
classical economic tradition that runs from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman. 5
Like many critics of free markets before him, Shapiro points out that maximiz-
ing wealth does not ensure its equitable distribution (p. 1008). Actually, there is no
basis for his assertion that "wealth concentrates in market systems over time" (p.
1007); families grow faster than the real rate of interest, making it hard to maintain
family wealth across several generations. But if people differ in their abilities, and are
not highly altruistic outside of their immediate family circle, wealth maximization is
consistent with substantial inequalities in wealth. Whether the inequalities can be
eliminated without an unacceptable reduction in the standard of living is a question
Shapiro does not discuss. Instead he denies that a free-market system is wealth
maximizing. That it is, is the proposition he claims I assert with "quite staggering
offhand confidence" (p. 1006), but he offers no evidence against it. In the six years
between my assertion and his article, the evidence that capitalism, whatever its other
deficiencies, delivers the goods has mounted to the point where there are few
doubters outside the academy. The socialist government of France, led by Mitterand,
has swung around to this view, as has the entire Communist world, China being an
especially dramatic example. England has turned its back on socialism, and after
having been the sick man of Europe under the socialistic Wilson-and seemingly
destined to be poorer than Greece or Spain-has the highest growth rate in Europe
under the capitalistic Thatcher despite declining revenues from North Sea oil. The
contrasts between West and East Germany, between South and North Korea, between
Taiwan and mainland China, between Singapore and Vietnam, and between the
capitalistic Ivory Coast and its socialistic neighbors are too persistent to reflect
4. The force was applied, according to Shapiro, by a dissenting colleague; Shapiro does not explain how a
dissenting judge can "force" an admission from the author of the majority opinion.
5. See Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985); Posner, The
Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy, 36 U. KAN. L. REv. 261 (1988).
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random factors. The record of the Reagan Administration in promoting free markets
is a mixed one, to be sure, but the Democratic Party is friendlier to capitalism today
than it was eight years ago, and undoubtedly one of the factors in the enormous
economic success of the Japanese has been their relatively unfettered capitalism-
their small public sector and low taxes. Capitalism may or may not be less just than
socialism, but it clearly is more productive.
I nevertheless agree with Shapiro "that wealth-maximization cannot be the
exclusive value guiding adjudication" (p. 1008). It has, I think, great merit as a guide
to common law adjudication, but not all adjudication is common law adjudication.
Federal judges spend a lot of their time interpreting statutes and constitutional
provisions that are not based on the principles of wealth-maximization, and they have
no mandate for misinterpretation. As the federal labor laws are notable examples of
such statutes, I cannot understand Shapiro criticizing me for the fact that my labor
opinions are "inconsistent" with my economic theories; I would not be doing my job
as a judge if I interpreted federal labor law as if it were designed to maximize
society's wealth.
Having knocked me about the ring for advocating wealth maximization, Shapiro
then accuses me of having abandoned wealth maximization when I came to write my
book The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform6 (p. 1009). The accusatorial tone here
is odd, for if wealth maximization is as pernicious a philosophy as Shapiro claims,
he should applaud me for abandoning it. He makes two arguments to show that I
abandoned wealth maximization. The first is that The Federal Courts expresses great
concern about the expansion of the federal courts' caseload in the last quarter century,
yet, from the standpoint of economic analysis, "there is, of course [there are a lot of
'of courses' in the article], no particular reason for the system not to expand over
time" (p. 1011); it is as if I were critical of the economy for having expanded over
the last quarter century. But Shapiro ignores my argument for why we should be
concerned about the growth of the federal courts, though not about the growth of the
economy as a whole. Beyond a point that the federal judicial system may already
have reached, and if not probably will reach soon, a judicial system is difficult to
expand without a serious reduction in quality. Society cannot add courts, the way the
economic system can add factories, to meet increased demand, because it is difficult
to coordinate the decisions of a large number of courts unless each has a specialized
jurisdiction-and there are problems with a specialized judiciary, as my book
discusses at length. The federal judicial system is already so sprawling that the
Supreme Court has only a tenuous control over it, and the problem will get worse. To
all this Shapiro replies that "if people demand services at a greater rate than they are
prepared to tolerate increases in taxation, the result must necessarily be a decline in
quality. But so what?" (p. 1012). So what? So plenty. The federal courts play an
important role in society, and they had better be able to play it well. Nor is it a matter
of the people choosing lower quality over higher taxes. It is not apparent how higher
appropriations for the federal courts would alleviate the problem of quality, and it is
6. See TnE FDERAL. CoUtRs, supra note 3.
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not clear either that the only choice is lower quality or higher taxes (a third possibility
is the demand-limiting measures discussed in my book) or that "the people" play a
big role in decisions about the federal court system.
Shapiro's second criticism of the book is that in criticizing the canons of
statutory construction and advocating in their place that courts attempt the "imagi-
native reconstruction" of framers' intent, the book surreptitiously jettisons my theory
that the common law is efficient-for the canons are a part of the common law (p.
1022). But they are not a part of the common law; they are rules for interpreting
statutes and the Constitution, and thus would not exist in a pure common law system.
Actually the canons are no more a part of statutory law than of common law. Rather,
they are a part of the rhetoric used by judges who have to interpret statutes and the
Constitution. As I have never defended judicial rhetoric-although I have frequently
defended the economic approach as a way of digging beneath the rhetoric 7-I am at
a loss to understand why my criticisms of the rhetoric of statutory interpretation
should be thought inconsistent with a belief that common law judges "do"
economics with surprising success.
Shapiro makes a third criticism of my book, and though it has nothing to do with
the abandonment thesis it is worth attending to for the light it sheds on a recurrent
feature of his article: its omission of any mention of certain highly pertinent aspects
of my scholarly corpus. The criticism is that when economic analysis is applied to
constitutional issues such as due process and free speech, it quickly degenerates into
an empty labeling game, with "costs" and "benefits" being substituted for the more
familiar "competing interests" of traditional legal "balancing" (pp. 1023-24). The
danger is a real one, but to evaluate it Shapiro would have had to go beyond the brief
illustrative discussions in The Federal Courts, a book that as Shapiro himself
emphasizes (it is the core of the abandonment thesis) is not centrally about wealth
maximization. Shapiro says that his research on my judicial opinions continued
through October 30, 1987 (p. 1027 n.154), so he should have been able to retrieve
the academic writings (and one judicial opinion) in which I try to put flesh on the
skeletal economic analyses of due process and free speech presented in The Federal
Courts.8 He should have acquainted himself with the literature on the economics of
the regulation of campaign financing, a literature that would help him to evaluate the
disagreements among the Supreme Court Justices over the constitutionality of such
regulation. 9 He would have learned that such regulation, by entrenching incumbents,
endangers democratic processes, rather than, as he suggests, promotes them. "For
every economic theory there is a competing one" (p. 1026) true, but they are not
equally cogent or well (or poorly) supported, and he should not have decided that
7. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21 (3d ed. 1986).
8. See Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982); Posner, Free Speech in an Economic
Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1 (1986); ECONOM I ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 7, § 21.1 & ch. 28; Posner, The
Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 1 (May 1987). See generally Posner, The
Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 4 (1987).
9. See, e.g., J. KAU & P. RUBIN, CONGRESSMEN, CONSTImTENTS, AND CONRIBTORS: DgFi.mtNrArs OF ROLL CALL
VOTING INTHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 8 (1982); Kazman, The Economics of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 519 (1976).
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economics has nothing to say about constitutional law before canvassing the efforts
of economists and economically minded lawyers to say something about the subject.
I turn now to Shapiro's discussion of my judicial performance. He examines not
only all of my opinions, but all of my votes, in the fields of labor and antitrust law.
The object is to determine whether I am being consistent with my academic writings
on wealth maximization and on the federal courts. I am not, in his eyes, since he
believes that the two bodies of academic writings are inconsistent with each other.
I have no quarrel with his choice of fields, but point out that the labor field is
misspecified. Shapiro includes three categories of cases. The first is composed of
suits involving arbitration under the Taft-Hartley o or Railway Labor Acts," the
second of proceedings to review decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, and
the third of suits by workers against employers under various benefits statutes such
as the Black-Lung Act.12 The three categories constitute an arbitrary subset of
litigation between worker and employer interests. If a collective bargaining agree-
ment contains an arbitration clause, disputes under the agreement are resolved by
arbitration; if it does not, the dispute is resolved by a court, applying federal common
law. Shapiro offers no explanation for excluding the latter group of cases, but it is a
small group. More important, if suits by workers seeking benefits are to be included
in the labor category, why not include other suits by workers against their employers,
such as suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,' 3 the Equal Pay Act, 14 the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,15 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964? 16 Shapiro offers no explanation for excluding these cases. He treats his set of
labor cases as a natural category, which it is not.
Shapiro's peculiarly designed sample contains 52 cases, in 28 of which I voted
for the employee or union and in 24 for the employer (p. 1033). In the absence of any
benchmark-the votes of other judges, of the average judge, of judges in other
circuits, or whatever-one might think that this distribution of votes (54 percent
"pro-labor") would be about what one would expect of the average judge, the judge
with no bias in favor of "labor" or prejudice against it. And in fact, Shapiro, who
offers no benchmarks of any kind that would enable my performance to be compared
with that of any other judge, remarks (he would say, is "forced to admit") that
"Posner's voting record seems even-handed, even comparatively generous to labor,
in his affirinances" (p. 1033; emphasis added). For if one looks just at the 35 cases
in which I voted to affirm the arbitrator or the Labor Board (or some other agency),
in 26 of these cases I voted for the labor side of the dispute. But Shapiro focuses on
10. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
11. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 41 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)).
12. Black Lung Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 901-62 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
13. Employers' Liability Acts, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1962)).
14. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206
(1982)).
15. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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the 17 cases in which I voted to reverse the arbitrator or agency. In only two of these
cases was the reversal in favor of the labor side, so he finds a "strong tendency" on
my part "to vote for reversals to the disfavor of labor" (p. 1033). However, a sample
of 17 is much less reliable than one of 52. While this might not matter if there were
a reason for distinguishing between reversals and affirmances, there is no reason.
Why would one expect a judge's pro- or anti-labor sentiments to surface only in cases
where he was voting to reverse? Why would one not expect the judge to affirm where
the arbitrator or agency had decided in favor of the employer, and otherwise reverse?
Shapiro draws two conclusions about my votes and opinions in labor cases. The
first is that they show that I have "not adhered consistently to the 'nonintervention-
ist's view'" that I advocated in The Federal Courts (p. 1034). Shapiro correctly
infers from the book that my concern about the mounting federal judicial caseload
inclines me to favor judicial deference to arbitrators, administrative agencies, and
other nonjudicial adjudicators. But a judge who never voted to reverse an arbitrator
or an agency would be pushing deference too far; he would be abdicating his judicial
function. Out of the 52 cases in Shapiro's sample, I voted to reverse the arbitrator or
agency 17 times (p. 1033). Is this too high a fraction for a restrained judge-a judge
who takes seriously all that I said in The Federal Courts? Without a benchmark, the
question cannot be answered. Shapiro provides no benchmark. Nor does he address
the problem of selection bias that a study of reversal rates involves. It is not true that
a court that was exceedingly restrained and known to be so would affirm all, or even
the vast majority, of the decisions appealed to it. The known attitude of the court
would discourage most losing parties from appealing, and the rate of appeal would
therefore fall; but among those cases that were appealed the rate of reversal might
well be unchanged, for it is the rare litigant who will appeal an adverse judgment in
a civil case if he does not think he has a shot at reversal. 17
The second conclusion that Shapiro draws from his sample of my labor cases is
that "at least some [of Posner's opinions] involve post hoc de novo re-evaluation of
the factual record from a court, arbitrator, or administrative agency below, in
violation of both traditional principles of judicial review and Posner's conception of
'macrojudicial' efficiency" (p. 1034). He gives three examples. The selection is an
odd one, for in two of the three cases I voted to affirm the decision of the Labor
Board.'s Any reader with the patience to read these three opinions can form his or her
own judgment on whether Shapiro's criticisms have merit. I want to consider the
question: supposing they do, what does that prove? It proves that in three out of the
29 cases in the sample in which I wrote an opinion-10 percent-I failed to give
sufficient deference to the arbitrator or agency. Given the difficulty and uncertainty
of American law and the fact that the easiest appeals are disposed of in unpublished
opinions (excluded from Shapiro's sample), it should be easy to make a plausible case
that an appellate judge failed in ten percent of his cases to give adequate deference
17. See Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
18. NLRB v. Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360
(7th Cir. 1983) (upholding four out of the Board's seven unfair-labor-practice findings). Shapiro counts Village IX as a
reversal; he counts all partial reversals as reversals rather than as affirmances-without explaining why.
1082 [Vol. 49:1077
ON THEORY AND PRACTICE
to the tribunal being reviewed. Before concluding that such failure demonstrates bias,
the observer ought to consider the other tail of the distribution-the cases in which
the judge may have given too much deference to the tribunal. Shapiro does not do
this. Thus, he does not consider the merit of the accusation by the dissenting judge
in East Chicago Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB 19 that the majority opinion-a
"pro-union" affirmance written by me-displays "excessive deference" to the
findings of the Labor Board, and, by "concentrating solely on the interests of
employees to the exclusion of the interests of the employer as well as the public,
makes a mockery of Congress' intent to strike a fair balance between the conflicting
interests of employers and employees.' '20 Nor does Shapiro consider that in NLRB v.
Browning-Ferris Industries,2 1 classified by him as one of my anti-labor reversals, the
key holding22 was that refusing to cross a picket line at the premises of an employer's
customer is an activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act.
Turning to Shapiro's sample of my antitrust cases, little need be said, since what
mainly divides us is disagreement over questions of substantive antitrust law. As he
reveals by relying heavily on the position of dissenting Justices (pp. 1043-44), my
views on antitrust are close to those of a majority of the current Supreme Court,
which has never reversed-has never even granted certiorari in-a substantive
antitrust decision written or joined by me. (It also has not reversed, or granted
certiorari in, any of the cases in Shapiro's labor sample.) So while it is true that "[f]or
Posner to claim that a version of his theory is now embraced by a majority of the
Supreme Court does not in itself establish that it is economically rational" (p. 1044),
the bearing of this observation is unclear. As a lower-court judge I am supposed to
try to decide cases in conformity with the views of the Supreme Court.
Three other features of the antitrust sample should be noted briefly. First, Shapiro
drops his earlier suggestion that reversals are more significant than affirmances, for
in the antitrust sample I voted for the plaintiff almost twice as often when I was voting
to reverse the trial court than when I was voting to affirm it, yet I am given no credit
for this. Second, Shapiro treats the existence of a dissenting opinion as conclusive
evidence that the majority opinion (provided it was written by me) was erroneous. My
opinions are thus subjected to close scrutiny, while opinions of judges disagreeing with
me are taken at face value. Third, in citing a decision23 that he regards as an exception
to my alleged tendency to give insufficient deference to findings of a lower court or
an administrative agency that favor the antitrust plaintiff, Shapiro describes the
decision as "arguably the exception that proves the rule" (p. 1039 n.202). Shapiro
should know better than to suppose that a rule is somehow proved by finding an
exception to it. The word "proves," in the expression "the exception that proves the
19. 710 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065 (1984).
20. Id. at 406-07 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
21. 700 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1983).
22. One member of the panel rejected this holding on the ground that it was excessively pro-union. See id. at
390-91 (Coffey, J., concurring).
23. Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987),
upholding, in an opinion written by me, an order by the Federal Trade Commission finding a violation of § 7 of the
Clayton Act, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 11 (the anti-merger law).
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rule," means "tests," not "demonstrates;" a rule cannot be regarded as confirmed
until its alleged exceptions have been examined and evaluated.
Since Shapiro is a political scientist rather than a lawyer, one might have expected
greater methodological rigor than his article displays. One has only to compare the
recent student Note in the Columbia Law Review on Reagan's appointments to the
federal courts of appeals to see the difference between careful and tendentious sta-
tistical analyses of judicial performance. 24 One of the results of the Note's analysis
is pertinent to Shapiro's theme: "four of the five 'academic' Reagan judges [studied
in another article] ... were more conservative than other Republican appointees ....
As a group, Judges Scalia, Bork, Easterbrook, and Winter voted on the liberal side
of the case only 12% of the time-far less than the 34% rate for the rest of the Reagan
judges and the 35% rate for other GOP appointees. Judge Posner, however, took the
liberal side over 30% of the time, much like his other Republican colleagues." 25
Finally, suppose that I were as prejudiced against labor unions and antitrust
plaintiffs as Shapiro believes; Shapiro's conclusion that the goal of my judicial
philosophy is to perpetuate an unequal distribution of income and wealth would still
be questionable. He assumes rather than argues that federal labor legislation, and the
sort of private antitrust litigation which pitches a dealer against a supplier-the
dominant type of case in his antitrust sample-are egalitarian in their effects. This is
a highly contestable assumption. Unionization cannot transfer wealth from share-
holders to workers in competitive industries. It can, however, in all types of industry,
transfer wealth from consumers to workers (the higher wages of union workers are
passed on, in part, to consumers in the form of higher prices). And it can transfer
wealth from worse-off workers to better-off ones; for, by raising the price of labor,
it reduces the demand for it (by spurring employers to substitute capital for labor),
and the burden of reduced demand falls mainly on the marginal workers. The net
effects are uncertain, and this is not the place to try to evaluate them; my point is only
that Shapiro is being uncritical in assuming that the tendency of unionization is to
equalize wealth.
As for the type of antitrust thinking embraced by Shapiro that sees the antitrust
laws as a charter of protection for dealers and other small businesspeople, it is hard
to see how the protection of small business can be conducive to the equalization of
wealth. Small businesspeople are not poor people, and if the antitrust laws protect
them against competition from more efficient big businesses, consumers will be the
losers, along with the workers employed by those businesses. And much stock in
large corporations is owned by workers' pension funds.
Could it be that all Shapiro has succeeded in showing-even if one accepts his
defective statistical analysis, as one should not-is that I am a champion of the
consumer?
24. Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87
COLUI. L. REv. 766 (1987).
25. Id. at 779 n.66.
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